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Abstract
Due to population aging, contribution rates of the mandatory German pay-as-you-go pension
system are expected to increase dramatically during the next decades. This paper estimates the
impact on the expected returns of contributions for different cohorts. I show that rates of
return for younger cohorts will be between zero and one percent, depending on the
demographic and economic scenarios; for some demographic groups they become negative.
The implicit tax rates reach levels of up to 80 percent of contributions for the youngest
cohorts. If decreasing returns reduce incentives for labor supply and system participation, the
whole system may become unsustainable. Indeed, I find empirical evidence for a recent
decline of voluntary contributions and for a substitution away from taxable employment.
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11 Introduction
Compared to many other OECD countries, population aging is particularly dramatic in
Germany. The fertility rates have dropped rapidly from 2.5 during the baby boom to about 1.3
thereafter. Additionally to the fertility crisis, life expectancy has increased at a rate of about
1.5 years per decade. With the decline in average retirement age to 60 years, the average
duration of pensions has increased by sixty percent from 10 years in 1960 to 16 years in 1996.
Thus, aging already puts considerable pressure on the German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension
system, long before the fertility crisis unfolds: in the year 1995 only 24.3 million West-
German workers (including unemployed) contributed for the pensions of 11.5 million
pensioners and over 4 million widows in the public pay-as-you-go pension system - an old-age
dependency ratio of about 60 percent (VDR 1997).  The old-age dependency ratio is expected
to exceed 100 percent by the year 2040 when the baby-boom generations are retired.
The net replacement rate of old age pensions has increased from some 60 percent in
the sixties to 72 percent by the end of the seventies and has stayed at this level since then. This
is substantially higher than the corresponding U.S. net replacement rate of about 53 percent
(Casmir 1989). As a consequence of program generosity and demographic shifts, public
pensions in 1997 made up for more than 12 percent of GNP and contribution rates reached
20.3 percent of the wage bill in 1997. Since 1992, the pension levels have been adjusted
annually, so as to keep the net replacement rate fixed1. This amounts to a net wage indexation
of net pensions. Due to the net wage indexation, productivity gains do not slow down the rise
in contribution rates. Holding the replacement rates constant, the most optimistic forecasts
yield a contribution rate of 27 percent in the year 2040. Even with a reduction of the net
replacement rate from 70 percent to 64 percent (as in the 1999 pension reform) the
contribution rates will reach a level of 24 percent in the optimistic scenario, and about 32
percent in status quo projections.
Population aging will not only drive up contribution rates. It will also reduce the
implicit rates of return of a pay-as-you-go pension system. A well-known theoretical result for
a constant rate of population and productivity growth is that the rate of return of the pay-as-
you-go system is the sum of both growth rates. A projected shrinking of the German
population of 1 percent per year with a 1 percent per capita economic growth would thus
result in a steady state return of zero. However, this result may not be very informative for
several reasons. (1) The population is not shrinking at a constant rate; (2) improvements of
life-expectancy may change the profitability of the system; (3) different cohorts are affected
                                                
1 Before 1992 the indexation was to gross wages.
2quite differently by population aging and changes in legislation; and (4) due to individual
heterogeneity the returns vary widely within cohorts.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to derive empirical estimates of the returns of the
German public pension system for different birth cohorts and demographic groups. There is
some recent literature on this topic. In two papers Eitenmüller (1996) and Hain, Eitenmüller
and Barth (1997) compute nominal rates of return for several cohorts based on the 1992
legislation. The advisory board of the department of economic affairs (Wissenschaftlicher
Beirat des BMWi 1998) and very recently Frerich (1998) have presented estimates of returns
based on the 1999 reform.  My paper extends the recent literature in several respects.  The
estimates of the returns of the German PAYG pension system are in real terms and are based
on the current social security legislation (Rentenreformgesetz 1999).  In order to assess the
effects of the assumptions on the rates of return, I consider three different demographic and
economic scenarios.  Finally, I compute expected pension wealth as the expected present
discounted value of lifetime contributions and benefits. The literature so far has simply
calculated the value of pensions as a function of life expectancy of a representative agent. One
can show, however, that this leads to an upward bias of the rates of return by 0.5 percentage
points.2
My estimation of expected present discounted values and of rates of returns takes into
account the risks of longevity, disability, and surviving spouses. The (real) expected values
have several important interpretations. First, from the point of view of an optimizing
individual, the expected values can be interpreted as the ex ante return on investment in an
uncertain environment for an individual of a given type (e.g. male/female; married/single;
cohort). Second, from a macroeconomic perspective, the expected values are the correctly
aggregated average values of all individuals of the same type. The aggregation over all groups
within a given cohort using the population weights of the specific groups gives the average
value of the pension system for a whole cohort. Third, the expected values are life-cycle
values and thus, a measure of intergenerational redistribution within that branch of the fiscal
system.
I show that the real rates of return are quickly deteriorating for younger cohorts in all
scenarios. The average return for the cohort born in the year 1930 is estimated to be about 3
percent. The average rates of return for the cohort born in the year 1980 are projected to be
between zero and one percent, depending on the demographic and economic projections. This
intergenerational difference is mainly due to demographic changes and only to a lesser degree
induced by the reform of 1992, which treats the older cohorts more favorably than the younger
                                                
2 This reflects the well-known fact that a non-linear function of the expected value of a random variable
does not equal the expected value of this function. This is also closely related to the aggregation problem.
3ones. The rates of return differ widely across demographic groups: as a rule, females get a
higher return than males due to a higher life expectancy, and married persons are better off
than singles due to survivor benefits.3 As a consequence, the rates of return for single males in
the youngest cohorts are clearly negative in all scenarios.
These findings raise the question of incentives for participation in the pension system
and for labor supply, since contributions to the pension systems may be increasingly perceived
as taxes. The implicit tax for the youngest cohorts will rise to two-thirds of the pension
contributions, which translates into a tax rate of 18 percent of the gross wage bill ????. Tax
evasion may eventually destroy the basis of the system.  Indeed, this seems to happen already:
persons who have discretion over their program participation have reduced their contributions.
I present strong evidence for a dramatic decline of voluntary contributions. Moreover there is
mounting evidence for a recent substitution away from taxable employment towards other
types of employment.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the set-up for the
estimation of expected presented discounted values of pensions. Section 3 presents the
different scenarios together with the resulting dependency ratios and contribution rates.
Section 4 reports the results on pension wealth, rates of return and implicit tax rates. Section 4
provides empirical evidence on behavioral reactions and section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Set-up
The Expected Present Discounted Value Function
The rates of return are estimated for cohorts born between 1930 and 1980. Within each cohort,
I differentiate by gender, marital status, earnings, mortality risk, entry to and exit from the
labor force. Each type of worker faces the uncertainty of the date of death (or the risk of
longevity) and the risk of disability prior to . The expected present discounted value function
of contributions and pension is in general:
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3 In a related paper Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1997) consider the intra-generational effects of the
public pension system, namely the incentives to retire early. In another paper (Schnabel 1997), I study the effects
of a transition to a partially funded system, which amounts to switching to a policy that holds the contribution
rate fixed as opposed to the 1992 legislation, which fixes the net contribution rate. The 1999 reform can be
4PDV expected present discounted value of pension wealth
s planning age
Es expectation formed at age s
R retirement age
YLABt labor income at age t
YPENt pension benefits at age t for retirement age R
ct contribution rate at age t (where age = year – cohort)
aRt pension per average annual earning (Aktueller Rentenwert)
δ discount factor = 1/(1+r), with r = real interest rate.
Setting this function equal to zero and solving for the interest rate yields the rate of return for
a specific demographic group. The present discounted value depends on several macro and
micro variables, which have to be determined over the whole life-cycle. The contributions
depend on the (aggregate) contribution rate ct and on the (individual) earnings YLABt. The
pension income YPENt depends on the individual life-time earnings, on the aggregate level of
pensions (aktueller Rentenwert, aRt), and on other specific features of the pension system. The
individual retirement age R is an important determinant of pension benefits and is made
explicit in the above formula.
Due to survival and disability risks the contributions and pensions on the individual
level are state contingent. That is, for each type of worker all state contingent time paths of
contributions and pensions have to be computed over the whole life-cycle. Then, the expected
values of contributions and benefits are calculated with respect to the random variables date of
death and disability using the probabilities for survival, for joint survival and for disability.
The expectation is formed conditional on the agent’s planning age s, which is chosen to be the
entry to the labor force. In general, the expectation depends on the cohort and gender specific
survival probabilities and on the probabilities of disability. The discounted sum over these
expected values is the present discounted value function. Finally, setting the present
discounted value function to zero and solving for the interest rate yields the rate of return for a
given demographic group.
Longevity, Disability and Survivor Benefits
In order to illustrate the computation of rates of return, the following formula gives a simple,
stripped down version of the present discounted value of the pension system for a single
person, neglecting survivor benefits and disability benefits:
                                                                                                                                                        
considered a mix of both, since it lowers the net replacement rate, but not to the extent of holding the
contribution rate constant.
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a(t|s) survival probability (probability to survive at least until age t
given age s)
In this simplified case only the uncertainty about the date of death enters the expected value.
The pension system would only provide funds for old-age retirement and would insure against
the risk of longevity. The detailed formulas for the full-fledged computation of expected
values are more complicated, since they have to deal with a multitude of state contingent
paths. Thus, they are relegated to a separate appendix, which is available upon request. In the
following paragraphs I indicate the method of integrating disability and survivor benefits.
In the case of disability the worker is eligible for disability pension benefits, which
depend on the whole earnings history prior to disability. In order to calculate the expected
value of disability benefits, one path of disability benefits is calculated for each possible age
prior to old-age retirement, in which disability can occur. Then, for each age until the
maximum age 115, the expected benefit is calculated. Moreover, the calculation of the
expected value of contributions has to take into account that contributions are suspended after
disability retirement. Thus, the contributions have to be weighted by the joint probability of
staying alive and staying in the labor force.
For married workers the expected value of survivor benefits has to be considered. It is
convenient to distinguish survivor benefits that apply when a working spouse dies before
retirement from survivor benefits that apply when spouse dies after retirement. In the first case
the computation is similar to that in the case of disability: For each possible year of death
prior to retirement the whole path of survivor benefits has to be calculated. Then, the expected
values are computed using the joint probabilities for husbands and wives. If the spouse dies
after retirement the pension claims of the survivor are based on the pension of the deceased
spouse. The survivor benefits have to be weighted by the joint probability of the death of the
wage earner and the survival of spouse.
The survival risks are estimated from the life tables of the Bureau of the Census and
are adjusted for the increasing longevity, depending on the specific demographic scenario. The
disability risks are estimated from the empirical distribution of retirement entries. This
overstates the true risk of disability, since disability retirement has been used as a substitute
for early retirement and as a device for lowering the official unemployment rate. In the case of
the medium and the conservative scenario, the risks of disability retirement stay constant over
time. In the case of the optimistic scenario, the individual disability risks are adjusted to the
decreasing aggregate level of disability, which is one of the main features of this scenario.
6If the present discounted values were independent of the old-age retirement age R, the
pension system would be actuarily fair in the sense, that it would not bias the timing of
retirement. As a by-product, it is easy to show that (assuming a discount rate of four percent)
there are still incentives for early retirement (see also Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 1997).
As the simulations will show, the rates of return do not depend heavily on the timing
of retirement. Note, that this is not a contradiction to the former statement. First, since the rate
of return is calculated over the whole life-cycle, the effect of a change that affects only a few
years is small. On the other hand, the retirement decision is a marginal decision which takes
into account the trade-off of staying in the labor force against leaving next year. Second, if the
rate of return of the PAYG-system is, say, zero percent, the impact of an additional year in the
labor force may raise the (total) return, even though it is not profitable at the margin.
The calculation of the present discounted value function requires several building blocks.
First, the demographic projections are performed up to the year 2100 using a detailed
simulation model for East- and West-Germany. The structure and size of the population feeds
into a macroeconomic simulation model which generates employment, exit from the labor
force and pensioners by age group for each calendar year. The simulation is also done for East
and West. The output of the macro simulation determines the aggregate budget constraint of
the PAYG-pension system. This, in turn, is required for the recursive calculation of the
contribution rates ct and the aggregate levels of pensions (aRt) for each year.4 Based on these
macroeconomic key variables, the contributions and pensions are determined on the individual
level.
The Individual Paths of Contributions and Pension Benefits
For varying ages of entry to the labor force the real earnings profiles are calculated taking into
account the upper social security threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). In years before 1997
I can use the historic data on average earnings from the administrative records. For earnings
after the year 1996 I assume an average growth rate of gross wages. For each cohort, an
average wage earner is defined as a person, who earns an average life-time wage. If an average
earner works for, say, 40 years he or she will accumulate 40 average contribution years
(Entgeltpunkte).
However, this typical wage earner has a life-cycle wage profile and thus wages early in
life are lower than average and wages late in life are higher than average. The life-cycle
earnings profile for each cohort are based on results of Fitzenberger et al. (1997). The life-
                                                
4 This calculation considers the demographic factors of the 1999 reform and the increase in the federal
subsidy. Details on this topic can be found in Frerich 1998.
7cycle profile induces a positive sloped wage path for each cohort. Other things equal, the
present discounted value depends on the time structure of earnings: The later the contributions
the higher will be the return. Additionally, macroeconomic growth is reflected in the growth
of the economy-wide average wage of a given year. As a consequence, the wage of a given
cohort displays a life-cycle profile which is superimposed by a macroeconomic growth
profile.5 Heterogeneity of the labor force within a birth cohort can be accommodated by
shifting the wage profile by a factor of proportionality.6
For a worker of the oldest cohort the earnings history starts in 1950 when he or she has
reached the age of 20; alternative simulations use age 25 as age of entry to the labor force.  In
1990, the workers of the oldest cohort have reached the age of 60, the average retirement age
in the medium and the status quo scenario.  At this point it is important to ensure that the
assumptions on the micro level (e.g. expected retirement age, life-expectancies) match the
assumptions on the macro level, which were used in the calculation of the aggregate budget
constraint and the contribution rates.  In the simulations of present discounted values I assume
an expected retirement age of 60 in the status quo and in the medium scenario, which
matches the average retirement age on the macro level.  Since in the case of the optimistic
scenario the average retirement age eventually increases to 62.8, the retirement probabilities
on the micro level have to be adjusted accordingly.  For life-expectancies similar adjustments
are made.
Based on the earnings profiles of each group, the (contingent) profiles of pension
benefits are calculated for all feasible ages of old-age retirement and of disability retirement,
taking into account the cohort and age-specific discount factors that apply according to the
institutional rules.
The Institutional Frame
I use the rules of the most recent reforms to compute the benefits and contributions for
different members of each cohort. The basis for the computations is the pension reform of
1999. The reform of 1992 introduced the net wage adjustment of pension benefits and
discount factors for early and postponed retirement. The discount factors for early retirement
will be phased in gradually. This scheme has been modified by several small reforms. In my
                                                
5 Technically, the wage growth of each cohort over time is the sum of the life-cycle wage growth and the
macroeconomic wage growth.
6 Since the elements of redistribution in the public pensions system within generations are very weak, the
position in the earnings distribution has no large effect on the individual returns, except for persons with very low
earnings (Rente nach Mindesteinkommen). In this paper I consider only pensions that are related to contributions.
8computations, I assume that the discount factors for early retirement will fully apply in the
year 2002 for men and 2005 for women and that both are treated in the same way (that is, that
men and women can retire at the age of 60 when accepting a discount of 18%). I also assume
that in the future, the same discounts will also apply to disability retirement, since this will be
the only way to prevent workers from using disability as a substitute for old-age retirement.
In a recent law (Wachstums- und Stabilitätsgesetz 1997) the federal subsidy has been
raised in order to keep the contribution rate at 20.3 percent – at the expense of a one
percentage point increase in the value added tax. Given the current rules, the federal subsidy
will eventually make up for 24 percent of the PAYG-pension budget. I assume that the federal
subsidy will offset the intragenerational redistribution of the pension system in the future.
Finally, the 1999 reform (among other things) has introduced a „demographic factor“, which
limits the growth of pensions. As a result the net replacement rate will be gradually reduced to
64 percent.7
3 The Demographic and Macroeconomic Scenarios
The Assumptions of the Scenarios
The calculation of the path of contributions and pension benefits for a given cohort requires
the contribution rates and the value of the pension claims over the life-cycle of each cohort.
For the time before 1997, I can use the historical data. From the year 1997 on these values
have to be projected. I use three different scenarios that differ with respect to the assumptions
on demographic and economic trends. The key assumptions of the scenarios are displayed in
table 1.
The first scenario extrapolates the current demographic trends and the economic
structure of the year 1994. It is thus termed status quo scenario. In this projection, the fertility
stays constant at the level of 1.346 children per woman, the net immigration is declining from
the extraordinarily high levels of the early nineties to 100.000 in 2020, and life-expectancy
rises steadily until the year 2040. The age-specific employment rates and the mean retirement
age are held constant over time. Note that using the employment structure of the year 1994 is
by no means pessimistic, since employment has fallen considerably since then. Reaching the
level of 1994 during the next decade would be a success.
                                                
7 The previous version of this paper was based on the 1992 legislation. The qualitative results for rates of
returns were similar. However, the projected contribution rates differ.
9The second scenario termed medium scenario only differs from the first one in the
demographic trends. Immigration is much higher and the rise in the life-expectancy much
slower than in the previous scenario.
The third scenario additionally changes the assumptions on employment and
retirement. The age specific employment rates are assumed to rise by 20 percent and the
average retirement age rises by almost three years. This is termed the optimistic scenario.
Table 1: Key Assumptions of Different Scenarios
   Year    Status-Quo   Medium     Optimistic   
Birth rate all years 1,346 1,415 1,415
Net immigration 2000
2020
2040
150
100
100
396.000
248.000
225.000
396.000
248.000
225.000
Life-expectancy
conditional on age 60
(males / females)
2000
2020
2040
19,4 / 23,8
21,0 / 25,6
22,4 / 27,0
19,4 / 23,8
20,1 / 25,1
20,5 / 25,6
19,4 / 23,8
20,1 / 25,1
20,5 / 25,6
Age-specific labor
force participation
2000
2020
2040
as 1994
dto
dto
as 1994
dto
dto
Increase of up to
20% compared to
1994
Average retirement
age
2000
2020
2040
60,0
60,0
60,0
60,0
60,0
60,0
60,0
61,4
62,8
All projections share the assumption that the Eastern states will catch-up to Western
levels by the year 2010. This means that life expectancies, birth rates, per capita income, and
employment are assumed to reach the levels of the West-German states.
Another important variable is the growth rate of the real per capita wages
(Durchschnittliches Bruttoarbeitsentgelt). This growth rate has been on average 1.17 percent
over the period of 1975 to 1996, and 0.84 percent from 1980 to 1996. Note that the years 1975
and 1980 mark the recessions after the first and second oil shock. It is also worth mentioning
that the average growth rate of real per capita GNP has been 1.95 percent since 1975. The
compound effect is dramatic: while wages have risen by only 28 percent, GDP per capita has
risen by 50 percent.
Below I present the results for a real wage growth of one percent, which seems to be a
reasonable assumption given the historical experience. It is often argued that wage growth will
increase due to a relative shortage of labor in the course of population aging. However, capital
10
is mobile and there is nothing like a worldwide shortage of labor. Thus, international
competition will tend to bid down German wages. Anyway, the mechanism of the PAYG-
system makes it very easy to calculate the effect of higher wage growth on contribution rates
and rates of return: (i) higher wage growth does not change the contribution rates at all and (ii)
increases the return one-to-one. This is also confirmed in my simulations.
Dependency Ratios and Contribution Rates for Different Scenarios
The consequences of the demographic assumptions are reflected in the fraction of elderly
displayed in figure 1. In the status quo scenario the fraction of the population aged 65 and
above doubles and reaches 32 percent by the year 2040. In the medium and in the optimistic
scenario the share of elderly reaches 28 percent.
Figure 2 displays how the three scenarios translate into effective dependency ratios.
The pensioner ratio (number of pensioners per hundred workers) increases in the same way as
the fraction of elderly in both scenarios that hold the employment rates constant. In the status
quo scenario 100 workers have to support almost 120 pensioners and in the medium scenario
100 workers pay for 98. Since the optimistic scenario assumes strong increases in labor
market participation the rise in the dependency ratio is mitigated considerably and reaches
only 78 pensioners per 100 workers.
The projections of the contribution rates are displayed in figure 3. In the status quo
scenario the peak of contribution rates will be reached between the years 2040 and 2050 with
values above 30 percent. In the optimistic scenario the contribution rates will reach a level of
24 percent around the year 2035.
It should be stressed that the projections are static, since they do not allow for
endogenous labor supply reactions. Rising contribution rates may reduce the incentives to
participate in the pensions system. A shrinking labor supply might further increase the
contribution rates compared to the profiles shown in figure 3.
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Figure 1: Projections of the Fraction of Elderly Persons. Persons 65 and older as
percentage of total population.
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Figure 2: Projections of Dependency Ratios. Pensioners per hundred workers 1995-2070.
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Figure 3: Projections of Contribution Rates of the PAYG-pension system.
4 The Returns for Cohorts 1930 to 1980
I report returns for cohorts born between 1930 and 1980. The 1930 and 1935 cohorts are
currently at the beginning of retirement; the average males in these cohorts have already
retired in the years between 1990 and 1995 and are expected to receive pensions until the
years 2008/2013, long before the population aging process reaches its peak. At the other
extreme is the youngest cohort, born in 1980, which is about to start working and will have to
carry the burden of the social security system for the next 45 years before retiring around the
year 2045. These small cohorts will have to finance the pensions of the baby-boom
generations of the 1950s and 1960s. For each cohort several demographic groups are
considered.
First, I present the results on the cohorts 1930 and 1935, which are almost unaffected
by the demographic and economic assumptions. I contrast the results of four different groups:
married males and females, and single males and females. Second, I present the
intergenerational differences in rates of returns, focussing on the group of married males. I
contrast the results for the three different scenarios. Finally, I estimate the implicit tax rates
assuming a specific discount rate.
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Cross-sectional Results
Married persons constitute the vast majority of retirees: about 85 percent of persons of age 60
are married. Due to survivor benefits, the expected value of social security pensions for this
group is much higher than for single persons (see figure 4). On average, a wife is three years
younger than her husband8 and will outlive her husband by about 8 years. Thus, in the case of
a married male, the expected time span of his widow receiving survivor benefits is 8 years.
The expected value of this survivor benefit adds to the value of a married male’s pension
claims. As a consequence, for a married male the rate of return is one and a half percentage
point higher than the rate of return for a single male. For married males born in 1930 the rate
of return of contributions to the pension system is well above three percent. Even for single
males in this cohort the rate of return is above two percent as is shown in figure 4.
The expected value of survivor benefits for a surviving husband is low due to the
much higher life-expectancy of his wife. Thus, only little is added to the net value of the
pension claims of a female worker in case she is married. As a consequence, the returns for
married and single females differ only by about 0.3 percentage points: For females born 1930
the returns are 3.3 percent and 3 percent, respectively. However, the rate of return for a single
woman is about one percentage point higher than the return for a single man. Again this is due
to the higher life-expectancy of women.
The real return of 3.5 percent seems to be quite a good deal from the perspective of
older cohorts. However, this relatively high return is due to the increasing generosity of the
pension system over the last decades which is unsustainable in a steady state. Moreover, this
cohort made only low contributions during working life, since the age structure used to be
very favorable. Finally, the growth rate of the German economy was exceptionally high in the
post war period until 1970. Thus the historical return of 3 percent is unsustainable in a steady
state – even with a constant population.
Although the older cohorts have faced favorable conditions, even a real return of 3
percent does not seem very attractive compared to historical, long run returns in the capital
markets. In the stock market real returns have exceeded 5 percent in the long run during the
last 40 years – even excluding the recent years. For investors who started saving in stocks in
the year 1955 and withdraw their assets in 1992 the real return of equities has been above 5
percent. For investors who started in 1965 the return of stocks has been 8 percent.  Even the
investment in German government bonds yielded returns of more than 3 percent.
                                                
8 I have estimated the average age differences using the 1985 and the 1996 waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel controlling for age and cohort effects.
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Rates of Return - Cohorts 1930 and 1935
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Figure 4: Rates of Return - Cross-sectional Results
Notes: Growth rates of real gross earnings equal to 1 percent after 1996.
Longitudinal Results
In this section I focus on intergenerational aspects. I illustrate the results choosing the group
of married male workers who earn the highest returns. This can be done without loss of
generality, since the differences in returns between demographic groups stay constant across
cohorts. Also, married males constitute the largest group of insured workers. The results for
other groups over time can be found in the appendix.
For married males the projected rates of return are displayed in figure 5 for cohorts
born 1930 to 1980. While married members of the older generations earn returns of 3 percent
or more, the returns for the youngest cohorts are much lower. The returns decline sharply in
each scenario.
In the status quo scenario, the rates of return stay only slightly above zero for married
males in the youngest cohort. However, also in the optimistic scenario the returns for married
males decline to a level of only 1.1 percent.  As can be seen from the appendix, in all
scenarios the rates of return turn negative for single males born 1980.
Aggregation over demographic groups within cohorts leads to an average return of 0.9
percent for the youngest cohort in the optimistic scenario. In the status quo scenario the
average for the cohort is virtually zero.
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Rates of Return of the Public Pensions System by Birth Cohorts
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Figure 5: Rates of Return - Intergenerational Results.
Notes: Growth rates of real gross earnings equal to 1 percent after 1996.
Implicit Tax Rates
The following figure 6 displays the expected discounted values of contributions and benefits
for married males of cohorts 1930 to 1980. The numbers are based on the medium scenario
and assume a real interest rate of 4 percent All values are measured in constant prices of 1995
and are discounted to the age of retirement. The discounted values of pension benefits shown
in figure 6 are equal to the real value of pension wealth at the beginning of retirement.  The
discounted value of the contributions can be interpreted as the capital stock that would be
available at the time of retirement, had the contributions been invested in the capital market at
a rate of 4 percent. For all cohorts the net discounted value (i.e. the difference of benefits and
contributions) is negative given a real interest rate of four percent. From the point of view of
the 1980-cohort, investing in the PAYG-system will accumulate to a loss of 800,000 DM (in
constant prices of 1995) compared to an alternative investment at four percent.
The ratio of the discounted values of pension benefits to contributions has a simple and
compelling interpretation: this ratio is the fraction of the contributions that would have been
required to build up the same level of pensions in a funded system. One minus this ratio can
be interpreted as the fraction of contributions that constitute an implicit tax. For the cohort of
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1980 this means that the same benefit level as in the PAYG-system could have been obtained
in a funded system by investing only one third of the contributions. If the interest rate were 5
percent, only 20 percent of the PAYG-contributions were required to yield the same benefit
level in a fully funded system. The corresponding contribution to a funded system would be 5
percent of the wage bill instead of 20 to 30 percent in the PAYG-system.
The implicit taxes are shown in table 2 for two cohorts based on the medium scenario.
The table first shows the implicit tax as a fraction of the contributions of a cohort. 38.9
percent of the 1940 cohort’s contribution can be considered as taxes; for the cohort 1980 the
tax is almost two third of contributions. Since the contribution rates will rise during the next
decades it is more informative to look at the tax rates as a percentage of the gross wage bill for
different values of the contribution rate. At a moderate contribution rate of 25 percent the
implicit tax rate levied on the gross wage will reach 16.5 percent for the youngest cohort. Note
that this implicit tax does not include the federal subsidy which is financed out of general tax
revenues. Given a subsidy rate of around 24 percent (according to the current law) the tax
levied on the youngest generation will be even higher.
Contributions and Pensions for Married Males by Cohorts 
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Figure 6: Expected Present discounted Values of Pensions and Contributions
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Table 2: Implicit Tax Rates
Cohort Tax as fraction of
contributions
Tax rate as percentage of the wage
at a contribution rate of
15% 20% 25% 30%
1940 38.3% 5.7% 7.7% 8.5% n/a.
1980 65.9% n/a. 13.2% 16.5% 19.8%
Notes:  Calculations of taxes are based on the medium scenario for married males.
5 Economic Consequences of Deteriorating Returns
With decreasing real returns, the incentives to participate in the PAYG-system are vanishing
for the younger cohorts. The implicit tax rates show how dramatic the development may
become. It is important for the analysis of fiscal policies to know how relevant these
incentives are for the behavior of economic agents. Two main questions are: (1) Do economic
agents realize that returns deteriorate, and (2) if they do, how will they adjust labor supply? In
order to address these questions, I examine the structure of voluntary contributions and
present some macroeconomic evidence on employment.
There is some direct empirical evidence for reactions of economic agents.  I infer this
from the behavior of those persons who voluntarily participate in the public pension system
(usually self-employed), and who have discretion over the amount of contributions.
Voluntarily insured persons make up for 3.8 percent of contributors.  The contributions of this
group have dropped dramatically during the ten years from 1985 to 1995: the fraction of
West-German males who contributed more than the minimum amount has halved within 10
years from 38 to 77 percent (see figure 7).  The same is true for women.  In the eastern part of
Germany the evidence is even clearer: almost all voluntary contributions are at the minimum
level. For West Germany, this minimum level is the contribution rate times the social security
lower threshold, which is about one seventh of the average earnings.  In addition to the decline
in average contributions the number of voluntarily insured persons has declined considerably.
This behavior may reflect the agents’ changing perception of the profitability of the pension
system.9
Why should self-employed persons pay the minimum contribution in the public
pension system at all? The main argument is eligibility for disability insurance, which requires
                                                
9 Individuals can assess the profitability of their own contributions by consulting a service of the local
administration („Rentenberater“).
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a permanent history of contributions prior to disability and a minimum number of service
years. Also, males need at least 35 years of contributions to retire early.10
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Figure 7: The decline in Voluntary Contributions 1984-1995. Percentage of voluntarily
insured persons who contribute more than the minimum amount.
After having examined the time series evidence, I now turn to the cross-sectional evidence,
which is also indicative of behavioral responses to incentives of the public pension system.
Figure 7 displays the average voluntary contributions of West-German males by cohorts. In
the year 1994, young cohorts contributed only half of what older cohorts contributed. Such a
cohort effect may result from the decreasing rates of return of the pension system over time.
Of course, what appears to be a cohort effect in figure 7 may as well be a combination of a
life-cycle (or age) effect and a cohort effect. Both effects cannot be separately identified by
cross-section data.  The life-cycle effect means that, while workers of a given cohort are
aging, they increase their contributions. The cohort effect means that younger cohorts
contribute less on average at any given age than older cohorts.  A potential life-cycle effect
stems from the fact that contributions made early in the life-cycle yield a lower return than
later contributions if the growth of average benefits decreases over time. Both effects work in
the same direction.  Note, that a cohort effect in this setting is not a pure phrasing of some
                                                
10 There has been a tightening of eligibility for disability insurance for voluntary members in the year
1984. This institutional change made the system less attractive for younger cohorts of self-employed.  In a
microeconoemetric analysis that exploits the quasi-experimental nature of this institutional change I study the
incentive effects of the pension system in more detail (Schnabel 1998).
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unknown underlying heterogeneity but instead, it has a substantive meaning, since it can be
related to a specific economic content.
Similar results can be obtained by examining the fraction of persons who contribute the
minimum or the maximum amount, respectively.  Figure 9 shows the pattern.
Average contribution of voluntarily insured by age group
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65+
age group
Note: 1. Average contributions of voluntarily insured West-German males in 1994. 
Computed from administrative records using the whole population. 2. The minimum 
amount in 1994 was DM 107.52. Source: VDR Statistik, Vol.115.
Figure 8: Average Voluntary Contributions by age groups in 1994
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Figure 9: Minimum and Maximum Contributions by Age. Source: VDR Statistik, Vol. 115.
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A further question is to assess how labor supply is going to respond to increasing
contribution rates that are perceived as increasing taxes by economic decision makers.
Unfortunately, the empirical results from the microeconometric literature on labor supply in
Germany are mixed. There seems to be consensus on a relatively strong positive wage
elasticity of labor supply of married women. However, there is less agreement on the labor
supply of men and unmarried women; it seems that their labor supply is relatively inelastic
compared to married women (Franz 1994). One explanation is that married women are the
ones who make the marginal decisions, since their marginal wage rate is lower than their
husbands’.
Labor supply responses do not necessarily take the form of reduced labor supply. They
can also show up as a substitution away from (social security) taxable employment. This can
be achieved by self-employment, by a tax-exempt second job, and last but not least by
moonlighting. The macroeconomic evidence points into this direction: since 1992,
employment in West-Germany has fallen in an unprecedented way. For the first time in West-
German history, the number of employed persons has been decreasing in five consecutive
years. However, this employment crisis is only due to a dramatic reduction of full-time
dependent employment, which is subject to mandatory social security contributions
(„Vollzeit-sozialversicherungpflichtig Beschäftigte“). This part of employment - the basis of
the social security system - has decreased by 10 percent (or 2 Million jobs) within five years.
All other components of aggregate employment have risen markedly, but not enough to
compensate the loss.11 Self-employment, insured and non-insured part-time employment have
reached new highs. This development may be the beginning of a substitution process which
eventually may destroy the basis of the social security system.
                                                
11 Own calculations based on the labor market statistics of the German Bureau of the Census 1998.
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6 Conclusions
This paper assesses the returns of the PAYG pensions system under the current legislation.
The main findings are that real rates of return are rapidly falling, because contribution rates
increase in the course of population aging. The cohorts that face rising contributions during
their working life are not compensated for this burden by higher pension benefits during their
pension age. This does not only create a problem of intergenerational equity. More important
may be the increasing inefficiency, since the incentives to contribute are deteriorating.  The
current system of net wage adjustment will guarantee the solvency of the system only in a
formal sense. To the extend that the tax base of the PAYG-system is eroding - and there is
already evidence that it does -  the solvency boils down to sharing a shrinking cake among
retirees and workers. The simulations are „optimistic“ in that they assume implicitly that labor
supply does not respond to increasing contribution rates and declining rates of return.
A simple conclusion for economic policy seems to be to search for ways to mitigate
the decline of returns.  In a related paper (Schnabel 1997), I study the consequences of holding
the contribution rate constant as an alternative to the current system. If the workers substitute
towards private saving, this reform would amount to a smooth switch towards a partly funded
system. Although such a reform improves the economic well-being of younger cohorts in
terms of net present value, it does not improve the returns of the PAYG-system. The younger
cohorts would be better off because of decisively lower contributions. In this context, a further
interesting empirical research question is, to which extend individuals substitute private
savings for PAYG-pension contributions when the relative level of the PAYG-pension
benefits is reduced.
22
References
Börsch-Supan, Axel (1995), „The Consequences of Population Aging for Growth and
Savings“, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim.
Börsch-Supan, Axel and Reinhold Schnabel (1997), „Social Security and Retirement in
Germany“, NBER working paper No. 6153. Forthcoming in: Jonathan Gruber and
David Wise, International Social Security Comparisons, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Börsch-Supan, Axel and Reinhold Schnabel (1998), „Social Security and Declining Labor
Force Participation in Germany,“ American Economic Review, forthcoming 1998
(Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association).
Breyer, Friedrich und Klaus Stolte (1998), „Demographic Change, Endogeneous Labor
Supply and the Political Feasibility of Pension Reform“, Working Paper,
University of Konstanz, Department of Economics and Statistics.
Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1996), Die Rente, Bonn: Bundespresseamt.
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1997), Übersicht über das Sozialrecht,
Bonn.
Casmir, B. (1989), Staatliche Rentenversicherungssysteme im internationalen Vergleich,
Frankfurt am Main: Lang.
Eitenmüller, Stefan (1996), „Die Rentabilität der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung –
Kapitalmarktanaloge Renditeberechnung für die nahe und die ferne Zukunft“,
Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 12:784-798.
Fitzenberger, B., R. Hujer, T.E. MaCurdy, R. Schnabel (1995), „The Dynamic Structure of
Wages in Germany 1976-1984 - A Cohort Analysis“, Discussion Paper 533-95,
Department of Economics, University of Mannheim.
Franz, Wolfgang (1994), Arbeitsmarktökonomik, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2.Auflage.
Frerich, J (1998), „Rentenversicherung zwischen Finanzierungsgleichgewicht und
Beitragsäquivalenz - Grundlagen und Ergebnisse einiger Modellrechnungen“,
Arbeitspapier, Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften,
Universität Bonn.
23
Hain, Winfried, Stefan Eitenmüller und Siegrun Barth (1997) „Von Renditen, Gerechtigkeit
und Reformvorschlägen“, Sozialer Fortschritt, 9-10/97, pp. 213-226.
Schnabel, Reinhold (1997), „Intergenerational Distribution and Pension Reform in Germany“,
Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim.
Schnabel, Reinhold (1998), „The Declining Participation in the German Pay-As-You-Go
Pension System“, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of
Mannheim, May 1998.
Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (1997): Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen,
Frankfurt am Main: VDR.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat des BMWi (1998): Grundlegende Reform der gesetzlichen
Rentenversicherung, Gutachten für das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Bonn.
24
Appendix
Figure A-1: Pension Values (aktuelle Rentenwerte)
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Figure A-2: Rate of Return by Birth Cohort 
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Figure A-3: Rates of Return by Birth Cohorts
- Medium Scenario
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Figure A-4: Rates of Return by Birth Cohorts
- Optimistic Scenario
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